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Abstract—With advances in Fog and edge computing, various
problems such as data processing for large Internet of things
(IoT) systems can be solved in an efficient manner. One such
problem for the next generation smart grid IoT system com-
prising of millions of smart devices is the data aggregation
problem. Traditional data aggregation schemes for smart grids
incur high computation and communication costs, and in recent
years there have been efforts to leverage fog computing with
smart grids to overcome these limitations. In this paper, a
new fog-enabled privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme
(FESDA) is proposed. Unlike existing schemes, the proposed
scheme is resilient to false data injection attacks by filtering out
the inserted values from external attackers. To achieve privacy,
a modified version of Paillier crypto-system is used to encrypt
consumption data of the smart meter users. In addition, FESDA
is fault-tolerant, which means, the collection of data from other
devices will not be affected even if some of the smart meters
malfunction. We evaluate its performance along with three other
competing schemes in terms of aggregation, decryption and
communication costs. The findings demonstrate that FESDA
reduces the communication cost by 50%, when compared with
the PPFA aggregation scheme.
Index Terms—Smart grid, fog computing, aggregation, privacy,
authentication, fault-tolerance.
I. INTRODUCTION
INTERNET of things (IoT) has revolutionized various ap-plication domains by providing communication and com-
putation capabilities at every node connected within the IoT
network. One such next-generation network is the smart grid
network which comprises of millions of smart appliances and
can be perceived as one giant smart grid IoT network. Smart
grid (SG) is no longer fiction, as a number of utility companies
have replaced or implemented smart grid alongside existing
power grid. This allows utility companies to significantly
improve their power generation, transmission, distribution and
control [1]. In addition, SG IoT network offers the utility
company the capability to diagnose fault during generation,
distribution, and transmission, which can help prevent power
blackout, as well as the capability to forecast power demands,
facilitate efficient billing process and smooth integration of
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distributed renewable power resources in the grid [2]. How-
ever, there are a number of potential security and privacy risks
in SG [3]–[5]. Utility companies, for example, use metering
data to perform data analytics to inform operational strategies
such as power demand estimation and for real-time monitoring
of end-point devices, as well as more effectively control and
optimize power supply and distribution.
However, clearly such data analytics also give rise to privacy
concerns [6], [7]. In addition, a malicious attacker could also
seek to obtain users’ consumption data and infer useful infor-
mation from such data (e.g., profile a particular household in
terms of their occupancy, living patterns, and economic status)
[8]. In traditional data aggregation schemes for SG, a gateway
is responsible for aggregating the SM’s reading and sending
it to the control center (CC). Because, sending individual
smart meter (SM) reading may reveal an individual’s privacy
and therefore, data aggregation is a preferred choice. Typical
SG IoT network architecture consists of a number of smart
appliances connected to a SM, which records the consumption
of each appliance and sends this data periodically to a gateway
node called aggregator. The aggregator is a semi-honest entity,
and to preserve user privacy, the SM readings are sent in
encrypted form. The aggregator is responsible for aggregating
the encrypted readings before sending such readings to a CC.
This saves time and preserves privacy. In a SG IoT network
architecture, smart meters (SMs) are the core components,
which collect users consumption data and provide information
about the electricity demands to the utility company. In recent
times, a number of cloud-based SG architectures [9], [10] have
been proposed, where the SMs transmit their consumption data
to a cloud. The data can then be used for billing, predictive
analytics to forecast power demands, and so on. However, for
a large number of SMs, the transmission of such data incurs
high latency at the cloud, and the cloud may not be capable
of handling all these requests in a timely fashion. To mitigate
such a limitation, we can leverage fog computing [11] by
partially shifting the computational and storage capability of
the cloud to the edge of the terminal devices. Fog computing
has enabled the extension of cloud computing functions to the
network edge by assisting the cloud and end users in terms
of communication, computation and storage. In the cloud-fog
based aggregation schemes [9], [10], [12], [13] the fog nodes
(FNs) perform the data aggregation, which can efficiently
reduce the computational and communication overhead at
cloud. While, in traditional aggregation schemes, there exist
an entity named ‘aggregator’ which is supposed to perform
aggregation and provide the storage capability. However, the
aggregator in traditional schemes is not a specific device and it
can be any device in the network. By having a FNs to perform
the data aggregation, we can leverage the inherent capabilities
of efficient communication, computation and storage provided
by the fog computing paradigm as suggested by existing fog-
enabled schemes for secure data aggregation [9], [10], [12],
[13]. This leads to a fog-cloud interplay to optimally use the
nodes deployed at fog layer for the purpose of providing data
aggregation. In other words, FNs perform the aggregation of
the readings from the connected SMs using homomorphic
encryption, prior to forwarding the aggregated results to the
cloud. Such fog-enabled data aggregation also resolves the
latency problem, as well as supports privacy and security.
In addition, such a deployment setup has the potential to
avoid the bandwidth and latency challenges that exist in a
cloud-based setup [9], [10]. In our proposed model, FN is
responsible for the aggregation of users’ consumption data
and forwarding it to CC. FNs are honest but curious meaning,
they follow the protocol but may try to extract the information
from users consumption data. To avoid this, we have used
Paillier cryptosystem to encrypt the consumption data, which
allows FNs to aggregate the users data in encrypted form. The
homomorphic property of Paillier cryptosystem enables us to
perform addition on encrypted data without the need to decrypt
it. This property can be used in secure data aggregation and
therefore, it is essential for secure data aggregation. Moreover,
FNs store the HMAC secret key for each SM, which enables
the FNs to perform the data integrity and source authentication
of the metering data.
A. Related Work
In this section, an overview of existing fog-enabled privacy
preserving-data aggregation (e.g., [9], [10], [12]–[14] and
traditional privacy-preserving data aggregation (e.g., [17-28])
schemes in SG is provided in detail. Existing fog-enabled
data aggregation schemes in SG, such as those presented
in [9], [10], have a number of limitations. Lyu et al. [9]
proposed a privacy-preserving fog enabled data aggregation
scheme (PPFA), which is based on One-time-pad (OTP)
homomorphic encryption. Although, it is conjectured that
OTP is unconditionally secure [15], however, OTP has a
number of limitations. Firstly, it requires the key size to
be as long as the message itself. Secondly, OTP requires a
new key to be generated every time an encryption has to be
performed. Thirdly, transporting or storing a large number of
keys is a tedious task. The scheme proposed in [9] is fault-
tolerant with lower computational cost, however, it requires
an additional round of communication among the participants
of the protocol (fog-node, trusted authority and the cloud);
thus, further increasing the communication cost. Furthermore,
the PPFA scheme does not provide any protection against
false data injection (FDI) attacks. Wang et al. [10] proposed
an anonymous fog enabled SG data aggregation scheme,
which efficiently preserves the users’ privacy and ensures data
integrity and source authentication of metering data. In this
scheme, authors have used Boneh et al. [16] pairing based
signature scheme for data integrity and source authentication
of users data. While, the Weil-pairing based signature scheme
is computationally intensive in verifying the signatures. The
authors have focused on achieving anonymity. Furthermore,
revocation of malicious terminal devices and fog nodes can
be achieved efficiently. Authors in [12] proposed an anony-
mous and privacy-preserving fog-enabled data aggregation that
guarantee anonymity and authenticity of metering data by
using pseudonym and pseudonym certificate. Liu et al. [13]
presented a fog-enabled privacy preserving smart grid data
aggregation which allows the service provider (SP) to launch
various function queries on encrypted metering data.
On the other hand, the existing traditional data aggregation
schemes are presented as follows. Lie et al. [17] proposed a
privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme, which aggregates
the metering data of users without need of trusted third party
(TTP). Abdallah et al. [18] presented a quantum secured
privacy-preserving metering data aggregation scheme. Authors
have used lattice based cryptosystem which involves only
simple arithmetic operations that reduces communication and
computational cost effectively, and it is feasible for appli-
ances have limited computational resources. Zeadally et al.
[19] proposed a lightweight and efficient privacy preserving
scheme which employs symmetric homomorphic encryption
and ECDH-key exchange schemes. It is resilient against
various session key attacks and it is feasible for resource
constrained devices. Lu et al. [20] proposed a novel data
aggregation scheme, which achieves differential privacy and
fault tolerance for an arbitrary number of malfunctioning SMs.
Similarly, the authors in [21], [22] have also proposed privacy-
preserving data aggregation schemes for ensuring integrity of
metering data and securing SG communication respectively.
Grining et al. [23] presented a privacy-preserving data ag-
gregation scheme, which is fault-tolerant for even against a
massive number of malfunctioning nodes. Authors in [24],
[25] have proposed fault-tolerant privacy-preserving data ag-
gregation schemes which perform the aggregation of users’
consumption data even if some of the SMs are malfunctioning.
Many researchers have worked on privacy preservation in an
aggregated data by collecting the data in multiple subsets [26]–
[28].
However, these traditional aforementioned traditional data
aggregation schemes do not leverage the capabilities of fog
computing paradigm and as a result these schemes suffer from
latency issues. Generally, in the smart grid IoT communication
network, a CC requests for the consumption data every 15
minutes from the SM. This means that after every 15 minutes,
a new key would have to be generated for the encryption and
decryption of smart metering data. The creation, transporta-
tion, and storing of this new key is logistically challenging;
thus, making OTP impractical for real life settings. To cater
this problem, we have used Paillier homomorphic encryp-
tion, which efficiently preserves user privacy and also allows
performing aggregation on encrypted data in this paper. To
achieve data integrity and source authentication, we use hash-
based message authentication codes (HMAC), which provides
efficiency in terms of computational and communication cost.
Furthermore, a time-stamp TS together with MAC is used
in our scheme to prevent replay attacks. HMAC ensures the
integrity and source authentication of metering data. More-
over, our scheme is fault-tolerant which means FNs can still
aggregate users’ consumption data and CC can decrypt the
Figure 1: System model
aggregated data even if some of the SMs are malfunctioning.
In contrast to the existing similar scheme presented in [9],
our fault-tolerant approach does not require any extra round
of communication between FN and the trusted authority (TA),
which makes our scheme efficient in terms of communication
and computation cost.
B. Contributions
The main contributions of our proposed FESDA scheme are
summarized as follows:
• We propose an efficient fog-enabled privacy preservation
data aggregation scheme in the SG IoT network. To
encrypt the metering data, a modified version of Paillier
cryptosystem is used and, no entity (except CC) can
decrypt the aggregated consumption data of users. More-
over, individual privacy is protected against malicious
CC.
• FESDA scheme is fault-tolerant, which means that the
collection of data from other devices will not be affected
even if 50% of the smart meters are malfunctioning.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme
with performance and security analysis. The performance
analysis shows that FESDA scheme is more efficient than
the comparative schemes. To prove the proposed scheme
is privacy-preserving and secured, we have performed
comprehensive security and privacy analysis which shows
that FESDA scheme is secured under the defined attacker
model. Additionally, our scheme prevents the reply at-
tack, FDI attack and, secured against malicious CC.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section provides an overview of the necessary back-
ground information on the important cryptographic primitives
used in the paper.
A. Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem
Paillier cryptosystem [29] is a homomorphic cryptosystem
which efficiently preserves the privacy of the data and also
allows to perform computations on the encrypted data. It
involves the following three algorithms:
• Key Generation: First, select two randomly large and
independent prime numbers p and q. Then, compute λ =
lcm(p− 1, q− 1) and N = p.q where λ is least common
multiple of p−1 and q−1. Set a function L(x) = x−1N and
select a random integer g where g ∈ Z∗N2 and calculate
µ = (L(gλ mod N2))−1 mod N . Finally, get the public
key (N, g) and the private key (λ, µ).
• Encryption: For given message m ∈ Z∗N , select a
random number r ∈ Z∗N2 and perform encryption using
public key (N, g): c = E(m) = gm.rN mod N2
• Decryption: For a given cipher c to be decrypted where
c ∈ Z∗N2 , and get the plaintext m using private key (λ, µ):
m = (L(gλ mod N2)). µ mod N
In the proposed FESDA scheme, we have used Paillier Cryp-
tosystem having key size of 1024 bits depending p and q
values. Paillier supports three different sizes of keys 1024,
2048 and 4096 bits. However, as SMs are constrained devices
and therefore, we have used a key size of 1024 bits. Although,
larger key size such as 2048/4096 bits can be used for
improved security, but these will slow down the system.
B. Message Authentication Codes (MAC)
MAC algorithm is a symmetric-key cryptographic technique
used for message integrity and source authentication [30].
MAC ensures that received message is from the authenticated
source and it is not tempered by any third party during
transmission. The sender, Alice, first computes the MAC on
the message m using shared secret key sk. Afterwards, Alice
sends the MAC-tag concatenated with the message to Bob.
Bob first generates the MAC on the received message using
same shared secret-key sk and compares the generated MAC
with the received MAC. If both MACs are same, then Bob
keeps the received message m and knows that message is from
authenticated source (Alice) and no third party has tempered
with the message. In this way, MAC protects both integrity as
well authenticity of the received message.
III. MODELS AND GOALS
In this section, we define our system model, attacker model
and identify security goals of our proposed scheme.
A. System Model
Fog computing extends the cloud computing and services
to the edge of the network and acts as an intermediate
layer between the Cloud data centers and the IoT devices. It
offers computing networking, location awareness, and storage
facilities so that cloud-based services can be extended closer
to the IoT devices. We envision a three-tier network hierarchy
framework for smart metering as depicted in Fig. 1. IoT
devices are highly distributed devices which are located at
the edge of the network along with real-time and latency
sensitive service requirements. In this trend, we assume that
there are numerous SMs attached to their respective FN in the
bottom layer of the framework. The SMs collect consumption
data from electric appliances, and forward the data to their
respective FNs. The middle layer comprises of FNs, which
are the computational and storage resources for the terminal
devices. Since FNs has the computational capability, therefore,
they can process or aggregate the incoming data from SMs,
while cloud is assumed at the top layer. FNs are one hop away
from network devices, thus the transmission of measurements
from terminal devices to the FNs is more economical as
compared to the transmission of all data from terminal devices
to the cloud. Since the cloud is only concerned with the overall
aggregation of all regions, therefore, FNs perform aggregation
of users’ data from their connected SMs and forward it to
the cloud. Fog-cloud interplay overcomes the latency and
bandwidth issues in data-intensive IoT. The system model of
the proposed scheme consists of the following five entities, as
depicted in Fig. 1.
• Trusted authority (TA): TA is the most reliable entity in
the system, which generates the public and private keys
to be used by the Paillier cryptosystem. Moreover, TA
also generates additional secret parameters for each user
as well for the CC. Afterwards, TA provides the secret
parameter to all users and the CC. TA is no more required
in the data aggregation process, once the key distribution
is completed.
• Smart Meters: SMs are the devices which collect the
consumption data of all the appliances on users premises.
Moreover, SMs perform cryptographic operations for
privacy preservation, data integrity and, source authen-
tication. SMs provide their consumption data to their
nearby FN.
• Fog Node: FN leverages the computational and storage
capability of the cloud to the edge of the end devices. In
our proposed model FN is responsible for the aggregation
of users’ consumption data and forwarding it to CC. FN
also ensures data integrity and source authentication of
the metering data.
• Cloud: Cloud first verifies the integrity and source au-
thentication of the incoming aggregated data from the
FNs and then stores the aggregated data.
• Control center (CC): CC has access to the cloud
and, gets the aggregated data from FNs. CC performs
decryption, using secret key and, gets the aggregated
consumption data of the end users.
B. Attacker Model Assumptions
In the attacker model, we have assumed that FNs, CC
and the cloud are honest-but-curious. More specifically, these
entities will follow the protocol correctly, however, they may
try to get private information of users. Moreover, the termi-
nal devices (SMs) are tamper-resistant. Our attacker model
consists of following assumptions:
1) FN and CC both are honest-but-curious. Meaning, they
will follow the protocol, however, at the same time they
are curious to know the values of the SMs readings.
2) Although, a user wants to have minimum electricity
charges, however, we assumed that all the smart meter
users are honest. In general scenarios, a user may temper
with the SM, but this is not in our scope as we assumed
the users to be honest.
3) An external adversary A may compromise the FN. The
adversary goals may include knowing the aggregated and
individual SM readings.
4) An external adversary A may compromise the CC.
However, individual meter readings are not exposed.
5) An external attacker may launch a FDI attack. However,
such injections of data will be detected at the FN and
CC.
C. Security Goals
The FESDA scheme aims to achieve the following security
goals:
• Privacy: The adversary A is not able to access the users’
data, even if the attacker intercepts the communication
data transmitted on the insecure channel. FN has no way
to decrypt the user data, so FN cannot compromise the
user’s privacy. Moreover, CC performs decryption to get
the aggregated data only, but has no way to get data of an
individual SM. Therefore, the privacy of individual and
aggregated SM reading should be preserved.
• Resistance to false data injection attack: In order to
gain some monetary benefits, an adversary may attempt
to inject some false values in the SM readings. Our
proposed scheme efficiently filters out the false data
injected from an external attacker. Any such modification
attempts should be detected by the FN and CC. Therefore,
injecting false or dummy values by an adversary should
be detected.
• Fault tolerance: It is assumed that some of the SMs may
be faulty for a period of time and may not provide their
consumption readings to the FN. Our scheme is fault-
tolerant which means that aggregation and decryption
of the SM readings can be performed, even if some of
the SMs are malfunctioning. Previous schemes have not
considered the issues of fault tolerance, which results into
high communication delays because then CC has to ask
the TA for the missing values and as a result the data
aggregation activity is halted. Our goal is to minimize
this delay.
• Integrity: Integrity of the metering data is preserved and
any modification from any illegitimate entity should be
detected. FN and CC should detect If the meter’s reading
has been modified.
• Authentication: The FN and CC should check that the
incoming data is from authorized source. Since, SM and
the corresponding FN have the same shared secret key,
therefore, FN can be ensured that incoming data is from
an authenticated source. Likewise, CC verifies the source
authentication of aggregated data from each FN. This
is important to avoid any false values from malicious
entities who may attempt to inject dummy values and
to victimize an innocent user.
IV. FOG-ENABLED SECURE DATA AGGREGATION
The proposed FESDA scheme consists of four algorithms:
(i) Key generation, Encryption and MAC-tag generation (ii)
Secure Aggregation and MAC verification at FN (iii) Decryp-
tion and MAC verification at CC (iv) Fault-Tolerant Aggrega-
tion and Fault-Tolerant decryption. The list of symbols used
in proposed scheme along with their descriptions are shown
in Table I.
Table I: List of Notations
Symbol Definition
ui User
SM Smart meter
FN Fog node
xi Secret parameter of ui
x0 Secret parameter of CC
CC Control center
TA Trusted authority
A Adversary
p, q Randomly generated large prime numbers
sk Secret key
(N ,g) Public key pair
(λ, µ) Private key pair
m Message
r Random number
TS Time stamp
H(Ts) Hash of Ts using SHA-256
ci Encrypted SM reading
MACi MAC-tag generation on ci at SM
MACj MAC-tag generation on received ci at FN
Ci Aggregated value at n-th FN
Ĉ Fault-tolerant aggregated cipher
Û Set of malfunctioning SMs
MACxi MAC-tag generated at n-th FN
MACy MAC-tag generated at CC
M Sum of all consumption data of all users
The Algorithm 1 generates encryption and decryption keys
for users and for CC respectively. Moreover, Algorithm 1
performs encryption of users consumption data and generates
MAC-tag on each encrypted value. The Algorithm 1 works as
follows, first, the TA selects two random large and independent
prime numbers p and q and computes the public key (N, g)
and private key (λ, µ) of Paillier cryptosystem. Afterwards, TA
takes a pseudo-random number generator function to generate
n random numbers xi ∈ Z∗N , where i = 1, 2, 3, ...., n, and
computes x0 ∈ Z∗N such that:
x0 +
n∑
i=1
xi = 0 mod λ (1)
Afterwards, TA forwards xi and x0 as additional secret pa-
rameter to each user ui and to CC respectively, via a secure
channel. Finally, TA computes Ti = H(Ts)N. xi and forward
it to CC. After this initializing, TA has no further role in
the aggregation process. Moreover, from lines 12 to 16 in
Algorithm 1 show how each user ui performs encryption
and how it generates MAC-tag on ci. SMs collect all the
consumption data m ∈ Z∗N from connected appliances, and
encrypts it using secret key xi.
ci = E(mi) = g
mi .H(Ts)
N.xi mod N2 (2)
The user ui also generates MAC-tag of ci using shared secret
key sk.
MACi = sk (H(ci) ‖ TS) (3)
Where TS is the time-stamp, which enables the proposed
scheme to prevent reply attack. Afterwards, each user ui for-
wards ci ‖ MACi to their respected FN. Algorithm 2 performs
aggregation of users metering data and MAC verification at
FN. The FN receive cipher ci with MAC-tag MACi from
Algorithm 1 Key Generation, encryption and MAC-tag gen-
eration
1: procedure
2: Input: Large prime numbers p, q, Function L(x) =
x−1
N , Message mi, Hash H(Ts), N
3: Output: Public key Kpub = (N, g), Private key Kpri =
(λ, µ), Secret Parameters x0, xi, Cipher ci, MAC-tag
MACi
4: TA chooses two random large and independent prime
numbers p and q
5: Computes λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1) and N = p.q
6: Set a function L(x) = x−1N
7: Select a random integer g where g ∈ Z∗N2
8: Computes µ = (L(gλ mod N2))−1 mod N
9: Return Kpub = (N, g) and Kpri = (λ, µ)
10: Generates xi ∈ Z∗N , i = 1, 2, 3, ...., n
11: Computes x0 ∈ Z∗N s.t. x0 +
∑n
i=1 xi = 0 mod λ
12: For message mi ∈ Z∗N the user ui at each time interval
computes
13: for (i = 1; i ≤ n; i++) do
14: ci = E(mi) = g
mi .H(Ts)
N.xi mod N2
15: MACi = sk (H(ci) ‖ TS)
16: end for
17: end procedure
connected SMs. Then, FN creates it’s own MACj for every
received cipher ci, as shown in Eq. (4).
MACj = sk (H(ci) ‖ TS) (4)
To verify the incoming data is from an authenticated source
and it has not been tempered with while in transit, FN
compares both MACs and checks whether MACi == MACj .
FN only accepts the cipher ci, if MACi == MACj otherwise,
FN discard that received cipher ci. In this way, FN ensures that
incoming metering data is from authenticated source and as
well as filters-out the false data injected from external attacker,
efficiently. In the same fashion, the FNs receives all cipher-
texts ci from connected SMs, and perform the aggregation of
the received encrypted data, as depicted in Eqs. (5) and (6).
C =
n∏
i=1
ci (5)
C = g
∑n
i=1mi .H(Ts)
N.
∑n
i=1 xi mod N2 (6)
Furthermore, after performing the aggregation, the FN creates
MAC-tag on aggregated cipher C and forwards C ‖ MACx
to the Cloud after embedding the current time stamp (TS), as
shown in Eq. (4).
MACx = sk (H(C) ‖ TS) (7)
Algorithm 3 performs decryption and MAC verification at CC.
The cloud verifies the integrity and source authentication of
the incoming aggregated data. CC performs decryption and
gets the all consumption data M of all users.
After receiving C ‖ MACx, the Cloud generates it’s own
MACy .
MACy = sk (H(C) ‖ TS) (8)
Algorithm 2 Aggregation and MAC-verification at Fog Node
(FN)
1: procedure
2: Input: Concatenation of MACi ‖ ci
3: Output: Aggregated cipher C, Concatenation of MACx ‖
C
4: FN receives MACi ‖ ci from each user ui
5: Generates its own MACj = sk (H(ci) ‖ TS)
6: if MACi == MACj then
7: MACi is verified and ci is accepted
8: else
9: ci is tempered so rejected
10: end if
11: for (i = 1; i ≤ n; i++) do
12: C =
∏n
i=1 ci
13: end for
14: FN generates MACx = sk (H(C) ‖ TS)
15: Forward MACx ‖ C to CC
16: end procedure
Algorithm 3 Decryption and MAC verification at control
centre (CC)
1: procedure
2: Input: Concatenation of MACx ‖ C
3: Output: Sum of consumption data M
4: CC receives MACx ‖ C from FN
5: Generates MACy = sk (H(C) ‖ TS) and checks
6: if MACy == MACx then
7: MACx is verified and C is accepted
8: else
9: C is tempered so rejected
10: end if
11: Performs decryption V = C. H(Ts)N.x0
12: CC gets M =
∑n
i=1mi
13: end procedure
The Cloud keeps the aggregated C only if MAC verification
is successful otherwise discard it, as shown in lines 5 − 10
of Algorithm 3. Thus, in this way data integrity and source
authentication is achieved at CC. Furthermore, FESDA effi-
ciently filters out the false data. CC has access to Cloud so it
can get the aggregated C and performs the decryption process,
which involves the following 2 steps:
Step1: CC uses it’s secret key x0 to compute:
V = C. H(Ts)
N.x0 (9)
= g
∑n
i=1mi .H(Ts)
N.
∑n
i=1 xi . H(Ts)
N.x0 mod N2
= g
∑n
i=1mi .H(Ts)
N.(x0+
∑n
i=1 xi) mod N2
∵ x0 +
∑n
i=1 xi = 0 mod λ
Finally CC gets:
V = g
∑n
i=1mi mod N2 (10)
Step 2: CC computes
∑n
i=1mi using Pollard’s Lambda
method [31] and, gets the aggregated consumption data M
Algorithm 4 Fault-tolerant aggregation and decryption
1: procedure
2: Input: Cipher ci, Set of malfunctioning SMs Û , Aggre-
gated cipher Ĉ
3: Output: Aggregated cipher Ĉ, Sum of consumption data
M
4: FN receives ci from Ui ∈ U/Û users
5: for (i = 1; i ≤ Ui ∈ U/Û ; i++) do
6: Ĉ =
∏
Ui∈U/Û ci
7: end for
8: CC receives Û , Ĉ from FN
9: for (i = 1; i ≤ Ui ∈ Û ; i++) do
10: C =
∏
Ui∈Û Ti
11: end for
12: CC calculates C = Ĉ C
13: Performs decryption V = C. H(Ts)N.x0
14: CC get M =
∑
Ui∈U/Û mi
15: end procedure
of the users.
M =
n∑
i=1
mi (11)
A. Fault-Tolerant Aggregation and Decryption
In case, if some SMs are malfunctioning, FN would not be
able to get consumption data from such SMs and ultimately,
the CC would not be able to decrypt the aggregated data. It is
necessary that CC can still perform the decryption even if some
of the SMs are malfunctioning. Algorithm 4 shows the fault-
tolerant aggregation and fault-tolerant decryption at FN and at
cloud respectively. Let us assume that total number of users
is U , and Û out of U number of users have failed to transmit
their consumption data to FN, where Û ⊂ U . Algorithm 4
from line 4 to 7, allows the FN to perform the aggregation
on received reports and, calculate the fault-tolerant aggregated
cipher Ĉ as shown in Eqs. (12) and (13).
Ĉ =
∏
Ui∈U/Û
ci (12)
Ĉ = g
∑
Ui∈U/Û mi .H(Ts)
N.
∑
Ui∈U/Û xi mod N2 (13)
Afterward FN forwards Û and Ĉ to CC, and CC performs
aggregation and gets C.
C =
∏
Ui∈Û
Ti (14)
C = H(Ts)
N.
∑
Ui∈Û . xi (15)
Finally, CC calculates aggregated cipher C.
C = Ĉ. C (16)
= g
∑
Ui∈U/Û mi .H(Ts)
N.
∑
Ui∈U/Û xi H(Ts)
N.
∑
Ui∈Û . xi
= g
∑
Ui∈U/Û mi .H(Ts)
N. (
∑
Ui∈U . xi)
Moreover, Algorithm 4 from line 8 to 14, shows all the steps
for fault-tolerant decryption. Likewise, as described above, CC
performs decryption using its secret key x0, which involves the
following 2 steps:
Step1: CC uses it’s secret key x0 to perform decryption to
obtain V .
V = C. H(Ts)
N.x0 (17)
= g
∑
Ui∈U/Û mi .H(Ts)
N. (
∑
Ui∈U . xi). H(Ts)
N.x0
= g
∑
Ui∈U/Û mi .H(Ts)
N. (x0+
∑
Ui∈U . xi)
∵ x0 +
∑n
i=1 xi = 0 mod λ
Finally, CC gets:
V = g
∑
Ui∈U/Û mi (18)
Step2: Similarly as described earlier, CC computes∑
Ui∈U/Û mi from g using Pollard’s Lambda method
[31] and, afterward computes the sum of all consumption
data M .
M =
∑
Ui∈U/Û
mi (19)
Moreover, FN and subsequently the CC verifies the source
authentication and data integrity using HMAC, in the same
way as described earlier in Algorithms 1, 2 and 3, when no
SM was malfunctioning.
V. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
The aim of this section is to show that the proposed scheme
is privacy-preserving and secure under the defined attacker
model. We evaluate our scheme on the basis of the privacy of
users, integrity and source authentication of the metering data
using five theorems. Theorems 1-4 are related to the privacy-
preservation while, theorem 5 is related to protection of smart
metering data against FDI and replay attacks.
Theorem 1. An external adversary cannot compromise the
privacy of individual SM reading.
Proof. An adversary may A eavesdrops the communication
between SMs to get the report ci of user ui. In FESDA,
the SM reports its consumption data to FN in the form
of ci = E(mi) = gmi .H(Ts)N.xi mod N2. If we let
the r = H(Ts)xi , then ciphertext expression will become
ci = g
mi .rN mod N2. The resultant ciphertext is still the
legal ciphertext of the Paillier cryptosystem. Since, Paillier is
Indistinguishable under Chosen Plain-text Attack (IND-CPA),
meaning even if an adversary A gets the ci, he will not be
able to recover the private data mi of user ui. Hence, the
individual user’s privacy is preserved.
Theorem 2. A colluding set of users cannot compromise the
privacy of other users.
Proof. If an adversary A compromises the users privacy, he
can get the users private data and may reveal the private
parameter xi. In FESDA, TA randomly generates the private
parameters xi ∈ Z∗N , i = 1, 2, 3, ...., n and there is no
correlation between them. Therefore, compromising of private
parameters of a few users (say j ≤ n− 1), will not reveal the
secret parameters of remaining users.
Suppose an extreme situation occurs, where an adversary
A succeeds in compromising n − 1 users, and gets their
corresponding secret parameters x1, x2, ....., xn−1. Recalling
from Eq. (1), the expression for n users can be expressed as
follow:
x0 +
n∑
i=1
xi = 0 mod λ
For (n− 1) users, Eq. (1) can be rewritten as:
x0 + xn +
n−1∑
i=1
xi = 0 mod λ (20)
This means without having secret parameter (x0) of CC and
Paillier’s secret key λ, an adversary A will not be able to
compromise xn. We can conclude that, no matter how many
users are compromised, the adversary cannot disclose the
private data of the other users.
Theorem 3. The privacy of ci and C is preserved even if the
FN is compromised.
Proof. Compromising the FN, an adversary A can get the
individual encrypted data, from Eq. (2) as follow:
ci = g
mi .H(Ts)
N.xi mod N2
Similarly, an adversary A can also get the encrypted aggre-
gated data, from Eq. (6) as given below:
C = g
∑n
i=1mi .H(Ts)
N.
∑n
i=1 xi mod N2
Paillier crypto-system is semantically secure under chosen
plaintext attack, and cipher ci reveals nothing about the
plaintext. Since, FNs has no security parameter to perform
decryption of metering data, meaning, the adversary A cannot
compromise the privacy of individual as well as aggregated
data C, by compromising the FN. Thus, even though an ad-
versary has compromised the FN, still the privacy of individual
as well as that of aggregated data is preserved.
Theorem 4. An individual privacy is preserved from a mali-
cious CC.
Proof. Since, CC only decrypts the aggregated consumption
data of users, and he has no way of inferring the individual
value of users from aggregated data. It means that the indi-
vidual privacy of the users is preserved against the malicious
CC. The CC receives the aggregated consumption data of users
from FNs, and performs decryption using the Eqs. (9) and (11),
to get the consumption data M of all users.
V = C. H(Ts)
N.x0
V = g
∑n
i=1mi .H(Ts)
N.
∑n
i=1 xi . H(Ts)
N.x0 mod N2
V = g
∑n
i=1mi .H(Ts)
N.(x0+
∑n
i=1 xi) mod N2
∵ x0 +
∑n
i=1 xi = 0 mod λ
V = g
∑n
i=1mi mod N2
Table II: Aggregation cost at Fog Nodes
Aggregation at FN 1 Aggregation at FN 2 Aggregation at FN 3 Aggregation at Cloud
No. of SMs Time (ms) No. of SMs Time (ms) No. of SMs Time (ms) No. of SMs Time (ms)
100 4 200 73 300 208 600 49
200 73 400 431 600 1108 1200 120
300 208 600 1108 900 2500 1800 213
400 431 800 1978 1200 4495 2400 310
500 690 1000 3071 1500 7432 3000 452
M =
n∑
i=1
mi
Likewise, if some strong adversary A somehow compromises
the CC, the adversary can get the aggregated value of con-
sumption data M . Since, CC has no way to decrypt the indi-
vidual user’s consumption data, therefore, an adversary cannot
infer the individual reading from the aggregated value. We can
conclude that, even though the adversary has compromised the
CC, however, he is still unable to compromise the individual
privacy of the users.
Theorem 5. FN can detect false data values injected by
external attacker.
Proof. To authenticate the source of data for each time slot,
HMAC has been used. Each user ui creates MAC on the ci
with time stamp TS, and forward it to FN as given previously
by Eq. (3)
MACi = sk (H(ci) ‖ TS)
While, the FN creates its own MACj on received ci, and
compares both MACs. If both MACs are equal, it shows that
incoming data is from authenticated source, and data is not
tampered with while in transit. For every time slot TS, the
FN always receives a fresh MACi. If this MACi is not fresh
at time slot TS, it indicates that a FDI has been launched
by an external adversary. Therefore, We can conclude that
FESDA is secured against FDI attacks launched by an external
adversary.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance aspects of
the fog-computing paradigm in the context of secure data
aggregation in a SG IoT network. More specifically, we have:
• Analyzed the aggregation cost, decryption cost at fog
node and at the CC respectively by providing a compar-
ison with the existing schemes [9], [26], [27] as shown
in the Fig. 2, 3 and 4.
• Evaluated the aggregation cost at FNs and cloud. The
data aggregation cost at fog nodes and at the cloud, with
the increasing number of SMs is shown in Table. II.
• Calculated the communication cost from SMs to FN, and
provided a comparison with existing schemes [9], [26],
[27] as shown in Fig. 5.
We have assumed three fog nodes in our experimentation and
all the fog nodes have the same computational capability.
Therefore, we have compared the results of aggregation cost
with the existing scheme for one such fog node. The proposed
FESDA scheme is implemented using Java cryptographic
extension (JCE). For the implementation of FESDA scheme,
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Figure 2: Aggregation cost comparison
we have used the data-set of Irish smart grid [32], while,
parameters used in our implementation are shown in Table III.
Although, there are some cloud-fog simulators i.e., iFogSim
[33] and YAFS [34] which have been used in various studies
to calculate the latency, network congestion, energy consump-
tion, and cost, etc., for cloud-fog scenarios. However, these
simulators do not have support to implement the cryptographic
schemes. For this reason, we have performed a custom im-
plementation of the proposed scheme. The objective of this
was to measure the cost of various cryptographic primitives
in FESDA scheme. The experimental results were obtained
on a system with Intel Core i5-3210(M), 2.50 GHZ CPU, 6
GB DDR3 RAM, and Windows 10 OS. We have performed
a comparison of proposed scheme with other state of art
schemes such as [9], [26], [27]. For performance evaluation,
we have compared the computational and communicational
cost. We have performed our experiments for 100 to 1000
SMs, which collect and transfer their consumption data to their
respective FN. The FNs perform data aggregation, and check
for data integrity and source authentication of metering data
and, forward the aggregated data to the cloud. Finally, cloud
checks for source authentication, performs decryption, and get
the users’ consumption data.
Table III: Implementation parameters
Parameter Value
Large prime p 512 bits
Large prime q 512 bits
Hash Algorithm 256 bits
A. Computational Cost
Computational cost is measured in terms of the time required
for aggregation at FNs, CC and the time it takes for decryption
at CC. For comparison with other schemes [9], [26], [27],
we have performed our experiments for 100 to 1000 SMs,
that are attached with FNs. The aggregation cost comparison
computed using Algorithm 2 as shown in Fig. 2, the plot
shows that the proposed scheme has less aggregation cost than
the Lue et al. and Tahir et al. schemes and slightly higher
cost than the aggregation cost of PPFA scheme. The proposed
FESDA is fog-enabled scheme, where major computations are
performed at FNs, therefore, proposed FESDA scheme has
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Figure 3: Decryption cost comparison
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Figure 4: Fault-tolerant decryption cost
lower aggregation cost than [26], [27] schemes. The proposed
FESDA scheme has slightly higher cost than PPFA [9]. PPFA
[9] have used OTP to encrypt smart metering data, although,
it is conjectured that OTP is computationally efficient and
unconditionally secure, OTP has a number of security and
performance limitations.
Similarly, the decryption cost at CC is computed using
Algorithm 3, and Fig. 3 shows the decryption cost comparison
of proposed scheme with existing schemes [9], [26], [27]. The
proposed FESDA scheme has lower decryption cost than Lue
et al. and Tahir et al. schemes and slightly higher decryption
cost than PPFA scheme, for the same reason as mentioned ear-
lier. The proposed FESDA scheme is fault-tolerant aggregation
scheme, which means that the collection of data from other
devices will not be affected even if 50% of the smart meters
are malfunctioning. For implementation, we have considered
that 10% to 50% SMs out of 1000 SMs, are faulty. Meaning,
faulty SMs will not transmit their consumption data to FN.
The fault-tolerant decryption cost at CC is computed using
Algorithm 4 and shown in Fig. 4. The plot shows that fault-
tolerant decryption cost increases at CC with the increasing
number of malfunctioning SMs.
Furthermore, the computational cost of others operations
(such as the cost of encryption, MAC-Tag generation and
MAC-Tag verification etc.) is depicted in Table IV. The secu-
Table IV: Computational cost
Operation Time (ms)
Encryption at SM 10
MACi generation of ci 2
MACi verification at FN 1
MACx1 verification at Cloud 417
MACx2 verification at Cloud 695
MACx3 verification at Cloud 1022
rity properties achieved in FESDA scheme and the comparison
with schemes [9], [26], [27] is depicted in Table V.
B. Communication Cost
The communication cost is calculated in terms of size of the
message from SMs to FN, and from FN to CC. In FESDA, the
size of cipher-text ci is 1024-bits. Since, we are using HMAC
with SHA-256 for integrity and source authentication, and the
time stamp (TS) is of 32-bits, therefore, the communication
cost of FESDA will become 1312×N bits from N SMs to the
FN. The communication cost of Lu et al. [26] is 1024×N bits,
while, the communication cost of Tahir et al. [27] scheme is
1152×N , from N SMs to the aggregator. For implementation
purposes, we have considered the message size is of 1024
bits in PPFA [9], therefore, the key require will be of 1024-
bits, as OTP is used in this scheme. Moreover, the signature
size is of 128-bits, therefore, the communication cost of PPFA
with differential privacy considerations will be of 1184 × N
bits from SMs to FN. The communication cost of proposed
scheme is much less than [9] and slightly higher than the
schemes [26], [27]. However, we are achieving data integrity
and source authentication, while the scheme [26] does not
ensure data integrity and source authentication of metering
data, and these schemes are not fault-tolerant. Likewise, [27]
is not resistant against the wide array of attacks, as FESDA
is. Additionally, in FESDA, no external party can inject false
data in SG communication, therefore, FESDA prevents FDI
and replay attacks by external attackers. Therefore, we can say
that the communication overhead introduced by the proposed
scheme is not avoidable, if FDI and replay attacks are to be
prevented. The communication cost comparison with [9], [26],
[27] is shown in Fig. 5.
We have compared proposed FESDA scheme with traditional
aggregation schemes [26], [27] and with PPFA [9]. The APPA
scheme [12] has focused on anonymity. To achieve anonymity,
the authors have pseudonyms and certificates. For encryption
the authors have used Paillier cryptosystem same as our
scheme. However, our focus is on achieving fault-tolerant
data aggregation. Therefore, we have chosen the scheme
PPFA for the comparison. The proposed FESDA scheme is
computationally more efficient than the schemes [26], [27] and
has lower communication cost than the scheme PPFA [9]. The
PPFA scheme has used OTP to encrypt smart metering data.
In SG data aggregation schemes, CC requires aggregated data
from SMs for better demand estimation. In this scenario, SMs
need to encrypt their consumption data for every 15 minutes
and forward it to their corresponding FN. While in public key
cryptosystem, i.e., Paillier cryptosystem, we need to generate
and transfer key for only one time. Consequently, it resolved
Table V: Comparison of security properties
Technique Privacy Data Integrity Source Authentication FDI Attack Resistance Replay Attack Resistance Fault-Tolerance Forward Secrecy
PPFA [9] 3 3 3 7 7 3 7
Lu et al. [26] 3 7 7 7 7 7 7
Tahir et al. [27] 3 3 3 7 7 7 7
FESDA 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
the scalability, storage and, communication problems, which
arise due to new keys generation, storage and transportation
of it. Specifically, speaking FESDA has reduced the commu-
nication by 50% when compared with PPFA [9].
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VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have proposed a privacy-preserving fog-
enabled smart metering aggregation scheme in SG IoT net-
work, FESDA, which achieves privacy preservation, data
integrity, source authentication, and fault-tolerance. Unlike
existing fog-enabled data aggregation schemes, which are
based on either based on OTP or pseudonym certificate,
FESDA uses HMAC to verify the integrity and source au-
thentication of metering data. The use of OTP or pseudonym
certificate is not practical in large scale distributed systems
due to key/certificate generation, updation and storage costs.
The proposed scheme filters out the false data injected by
external attackers (i.e. FDI attack resilience). The use of
Paillier and HMAC efficiently reduces the computational and
communication overhead and improves the work efficiency
of FNs and CC. In addition, the proposed scheme is proven
to be fault-tolerant and computationally inexpensive in terms
of aggregation, decryption, and communication costs as com-
pared to its counterparts. Future research includes redesigning
the privacy-preserving data aggregation so that it does not
involve any trusted authority (TA), for example by using
secure multi-party computation (SMPC) for data aggregation.
In addition, designing a virtualised privacy-preserving billing
mechanism by leveraging the software defined networking and
network function virtualization for fog-enabled smart metering
infrastructure can be interesting future extension of this work.
REFERENCES
[1] B. Li, R. Lu, K. R. Choo, W. Wang, and S. Luo, “On reliability analysis
of smart grids under topology attacks: A stochastic petri net approach,”
ACM Trans. on Cyberphysical Systems, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 10:1–10:25,
2019. [Online]. Available: https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3127021
[2] X. Fang, S. Misra, G. Xue, and D. Yang, “Smart grid—the new and
improved power grid: A survey,” IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 14,
no. 4, pp. 944–980, 2012.
[3] B. Li, R. Lu, W. Wang, and K. R. Choo, “Distributed host-
based collaborative detection for false data injection attacks in
smart grid cyber-physical system,” Journal of Parallel and Distributed
Computing, vol. 103, pp. 32–41, 2017. [Online]. Available: https:
//doi.org/10.1016/j.jpdc.2016.12.012
[4] G. D. L. T. Parra, P. Rad, and K. R. Choo, “Implementation
of deep packet inspection in smart grids and industrial internet
of things: Challenges and opportunities,” Journal of Network and
Computer Applications, vol. 135, pp. 32–46, 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2019.02.022
[5] S. Garg, K. Kaur, G. Kaddoum, J. J. P. C. Rodrigues, and M. Guizani,
“Secure and lightweight authentication scheme for smart metering in-
frastructure in smart grid,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics,
pp. 1–1, 2019.
[6] S. Ge, P. Zeng, R. Lu, and K. R. Choo, “FGDA: fine-grained data
analysis in privacy-preserving smart grid communications,” Peer-to-
Peer Networking and Applications, vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 966–978, 2018.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12083-017-0618-9
[7] V. K. PRASAD, M. BHAVSAR, and S. TANWAR, “Influence of
montoring: Fog and edge computing,” Scalable Computing: Practice
and Experience, vol. 20, no. 2, p. 365–376, May 2019.
[8] G. Wood and M. Newborough, “Dynamic energy-consumption indi-
cators for domestic appliances: environment, behaviour and design,”
Energy and buildings, vol. 35, no. 8, pp. 821–841, 2003.
[9] L. Lyu, K. Nandakumar, B. Rubinstein, J. Jin, J. Bedo, and
M. Palaniswami, “Ppfa: Privacy preserving fog-enabled aggregation in
smart grid,” IEEE Trans. on Ind. Informat., 2018.
[10] H. Wang, Z. Wang, and J. Domingo-Ferrer, “Anonymous and secure
aggregation scheme in fog-based public cloud computing,” Future
Generation Computer Systems, vol. 78, pp. 712–719, 2018.
[11] A. Kumari, S. Tanwar, S. Tyagi, N. Kumar, M. S. Obaidat, and J. J.
P. C. Rodrigues, “Fog computing for smart grid systems in the 5g en-
vironment: Challenges and solutions,” IEEE Wireless Communications,
vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 47–53, June 2019.
[12] Z. Guan, Y. Zhang, L. Wu, J. Wu, J. Li, Y. Ma, and J. Hu, “Appa:
An anonymous and privacy preserving data aggregation scheme for fog-
enhanced iot,” Journal of Network and Computer Applications, vol. 125,
pp. 82–92, 2019.
[13] J.-N. Liu, J. Weng, A. Yang, Y. Chen, and X. Lin, “Enabling efficient
and privacy-preserving aggregation communication and function query
for fog computing based smart grid,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 2019.
[14] S. Garg, K. Kaur, G. Kaddoum, and K. R. Choo, “Towards secure and
provable authentication for internet of things: Realizing industry 4.0,”
IEEE Internet of Things Journal, pp. 1–1, 2019.
[15] A. M. Odlyzko, “Public key cryptography,” AT&T Technical Journal,
vol. 73, no. 5, pp. 17–23, 1994.
[16] D. Boneh, B. Lynn, and H. Shacham, “Short signatures from the weil
pairing,” in International Conference on the Theory and Application of
Cryptology and Information Security. Springer, 2001, pp. 514–532.
[17] Y. Liu, W. Guo, C.-I. Fan, L. Chang, and C. Cheng, “A practical privacy-
preserving data aggregation (3pda) scheme for smart grid,” IEEE Trans.
on Ind. Informat., 2018.
[18] A. Abdallah and X. Shen, “A lightweight lattice-based homomorphic
privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme for smart grid,” IEEE Trans.
on Smart Grid, 2016.
[19] M. Badra and S. Zeadally, “Lightweight and efficient privacy-preserving
data aggregation approach for the smart grid,” Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 64,
pp. 32–40, 2017.
[20] H. Bao and R. Lu, “Ddpft: Secure data aggregation scheme with dif-
ferential privacy and fault tolerance,” in IEEE International Conference
on Communications (ICC), 2015, pp. 7240–7245.
[21] ——, “A lightweight data aggregation scheme achieving privacy preser-
vation and data integrity with differential privacy and fault tolerance,”
Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 106–121,
2017.
[22] V. Ford, A. Siraj, and M. A. Rahman, “Secure and efficient protection
of consumer privacy in advanced metering infrastructure supporting
fine-grained data analysis,” Journal of Computer and System Sciences,
vol. 83, no. 1, pp. 84–100, 2017.
[23] K. Grining, M. Klonowski, and P. Syga, “On practical privacy-preserving
fault-tolerant data aggregation,” International Journal of Information
Security, pp. 1–20, 2018.
[24] F. Knirsch, D. Engel, and Z. Erkin, “A fault-tolerant and efficient scheme
for data aggregation over groups in the smart grid,” in IEEE Workshop
on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS), 2017, pp. 1–6.
[25] J. Ni, K. Zhang, K. Alharbi, X. Lin, N. Zhang, and X. S. Shen,
“Differentially private smart metering with fault tolerance and range-
based filtering,” IEEE Trans. on Smart Grid, vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 2483–
2493, 2017.
[26] R. Lu, K. Alharbi, X. Lin, and C. Huang, “A novel privacy-preserving
set aggregation scheme for smart grid communications,” in IEEE Global
Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2015, pp. 1–6.
[27] M. Tahir, A. Khan, A. Hameed, M. Alam, M. K. Khan, and F. Jabeen,
“Towards a set aggregation-based data integrity scheme for smart grids,”
Annals of Telecommunications, vol. 72, no. 9-10, pp. 551–561, 2017.
[28] S. Li, K. Xue, Q. Yang, and P. Hong, “Ppma: Privacy-preserving mul-
tisubset data aggregation in smart grid,” IEEE Trans. on Ind. Informat.,
vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 462–471, 2018.
[29] P. Paillier, “Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree resid-
uosity classes,” in International Conference on the Theory and Applica-
tions of Cryptographic Techniques, 1999, pp. 223–238.
[30] M. Bellare, R. Canetti, and H. Krawczyk, “Keying hash functions for
message authentication,” in Annual international cryptology conference.
Springer, 1996, pp. 1–15.
[31] J. Katz, A. J. Menezes, P. C. Van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone,
Handbook of applied cryptography. CRC press, 1996.
[32] E. A. of Ireland. (2019) Commission for en-
ergy regulation. [Online]. Available: http://www.ucd.ie/issda/data/
commissionforenergyregulationcer/
[33] H. Gupta, A. Vahid Dastjerdi, S. K. Ghosh, and R. Buyya, “ifogsim: A
toolkit for modeling and simulation of resource management techniques
in the internet of things, edge and fog computing environments,”
Software: Practice and Experience, vol. 47, no. 9, pp. 1275–1296, 2017.
[34] I. Lera, C. Guerrero, and C. Juiz, “Yafs: A simulator for iot scenarios
in fog computing,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.01091, 2019.
